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During the last few decades, globalization and protectionism have ebbed and
flowed from time to time among economies. The movements demand that we
develop formal analytics that can help countries make better trade policies.
The movements also imply that the best trade policies are time-varying and
country-specific. Economies and their imports and exports constitute a coun-
terbalanced network where conflict and cooperation are two sides of the same
coin of the global economy. A country could improve its relative strength in the
interactive network by embracing globalization, protectionism, or a trade war.
This paper provides necessary conditions for globalization and trade wars,
evaluates their side effects, identifies the right targets for conflict, and recom-
mends a fair resolution for a trade war. Data from 2018 show that trade wars
could be an option for the USA to maintain its competitiveness. However, ad-
verse side effects on third parties could be significant. Nevertheless, whether
the USA should engage in protectionism depends on its bargaining power.
1
Introduction
Anti-globalization and trade war are two levels of economic disputes — the latter involves two
trading partners, while the other represents one country’s segregating from global economic in-
tegration. Nevertheless, both could adversely affect the global economy indirectly. To formulate
simple but decisive rules for either level of conflict, we focus on import and export activities,
ignoring political, territorial, ideological, military, and cultural conflicts. From this perspective,
the purpose of trade wars or globalization is to improve one’s relative strength in the trading
system.
To analytically examine trade wars and globalization, we face four daunting challenges.
The first one is to adequately construct a high-level description of the trading system because
exports and imports are already comparative advantages of specific goods and services. The
second challenge is to quantitatively set the parties’ goals in the conflicting and cooperative
situations, such as their relative competitiveness. Thirdly, we need to relate policy variables
(such as tariff level and import quota) to the goals. After that, optimization methods choose
appropriate policies to maximize their goals. Finally, data can be used in the analytics to explain
recent and past events.
We set the objective function by the solution to a counterbalance equilibrium in the global
economic system (4). The solution, called authority distribution, integrates both cooperation
and competition inside the system. It is not subjectively assigned by an expert on utility func-
tion but implied from the data. It is more representative of the world economy than a pure
cooperative or a pure non-cooperative solution. Moreover, the Matthew effect in the solution is
also a driving force for both competition and collaboration.
When starting a trade war against a partner, a country raises tariffs or creates other trade
barriers to increase its competitiveness. However, the result depends on the strength of the
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counterpart’s reaction. We find a simple threshold— the ratio of their competitiveness—which
determines whether the country should engage in a trade war. On the other hand, the counter
partner’s reaction should be limited by their GDP ratios to avoid trade deficits. To achieve a
win-win resolution, therefore, both parties could accept the midpoint between these two ratios.
In the literature on trade wars (1, 2, 5), in general, a payoff function or welfare function is set
up to find optimal solutions, such as the tariff levels, from an equilibrium point. One advantage
of our solution is that the objective function is not explicitly expressed, but implied from the
counterbalance equilibrium. Also, we need fewer assumptions to accomplish this.
When a country has no specific targets to confront, it could go with globalization or protec-
tionism. While there are fewer game-theoretic studies of economic globalization in the litera-
ture, there are more debates (6, 7). Our arguments are data-driven and ignore arguments from
both sides of the debates, such as labor markets, production chains, environment issues, and
national security. Trade policymakers may have carefully weighed these considerations; thus,
the trading data may reflect them. Hence, we believe a country could engage in either global-
ization or protectionism, depending on its specific situation at a specific time. By analyzing the
ComTrade data in 2000 and 2018, we find that globalization was a better choice for economic
superpowers in 2000. However, protectionism could have been a better choice for the United
States and the United Kingdom in 2018, but a worse one for China, Germany, and Japan.
In the following exposition, we first set up the objective function for countries. Then, a
necessary condition for starting a trade war is formulated to maximize the objective function.
Next, we discuss a similar condition for globalization. In an empirical study, we examine real
trading data for the years 2000 and 2018. Finally, we discuss several extensions and limitations
of this framework.
3
Competitive Advantage in the Trading System
Assume there are n countries in the trading system. Let the n×n matrix P = [Pi j],1≤ i, j ≤ n,
where Pi j is the portion of i’s GDP, which exports to j. The exports include both goods and
services, and the non-exporting portion of GDP is Pii. Thus, Pi j measures a direct influence of
country j on i. However, as mentioned in (3), the direct influences in matrix P do not warrant
a consistent linear order of countries’ competitiveness. In particular, the direct impacts ignore
ripple or spillover effects. Even though a product bears the mark of being made in one country,
its components may come from other places. For example, when China exports a smartphone
to the USA, its chip could be made in the USA and the camera in Korea. Japanese could
partially own the chip and camera companies. To integrate these spillover effects, we should
also consider indirect and long-run impacts.
One consistent solution, called authority distribution, was studied in (4). The solution is a
1×n row vector pi which solves the following counterbalance equilibrium
pi = piP (1)
subject to
n
∑
i=1
pii = 1 and pii ≥ 0. The distribution pi exists and is unique in the well-connected
trading system. As described in (4), the distribution, which absorbs all spillover effects, mea-
sures the countries’ long-run influences in the trading system.
The counterbalance equilibrium comes from two parts. On the one hand, the ith element
pii =
n
∑
j=1
pi jPi j
describes how direct influence flows from other countries into i. It derives more authority from
influential trading partners than from non-influential ones, other things being equal. It also
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derives more authority from countries on which it has a large direct influence, other things
being equal. On the other hand, i also contributes to other countries that have direct influences
on i, as seen from the outflow equation
pik = piiPki +∑
j 6=i
pi jPk j
The larger Pik, the more i contributes to k’s authority. The inflow influence and outflow influence
eventually reach an equilibrium in Eq.(1).
The counterbalance equilibrium has a mixed cooperative and non-cooperative character.
From the cooperative side, country i would assist j in improving pi j whenever Pji > 0 because
pi jPji is a component of pii =
n
∑
k=1
pikPki. From the competitive side, as pi1= 1, an increase of pi j
may mean a decrease of pii. Thus, the trade-off is how much country i should assist or contest j
without sacrificing its own interests.
Moreover, pi has the Matthew effect of accumulated advantage. The spillover effects take
two further actions: amplification of real comparative advantages and off-setting of noisy ones.
One consequence of the spillover is that some powerful economies have substantial authority
compared to less-powerful ones. For example, the USA’s pii could be much higher than Japan’s,
while their GDP ratio is much closer. The amplification comes from the USA’s relative ad-
vantages over other countries, compared to Japan’s. Another consequence is that an economic
superpower would be expected to make all efforts to maintain its superpower status when facing
challenges from emerging competitors.
We use pii as the objective function for country i. It is not subjectively determined by a com-
mittee, but rather endogenously implied from the trading data. It quantifies both the width and
depth of the economy. Each country has its unique location, history, legislation, and economic
system. A single utility function may not be sufficient enough to capture this diversity. Thus,
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using a single utility function could reduce economies to only one stereotype. In contrast, our
starting point is to recognize that each country is different, as is its trading partners. Each adds
inclusiveness value to the global economy.
A Necessary Condition for a Bilateral Trade War
We assume that a bilateral trade war involves two counter partners without directly sacrificing
third parties. Say, country i considers a trade war against its trading partner j. Gaming on
the matrix P, i’s action could change the element Pji — the portion of j’s GDP exported to
i. Raising tariffs and creating other trade barriers against j, for example, reduce imports from
country j and, consequently, reduces Pji. At the same time, country j could react by decreasing
Pi j. Say, for a ∆Pji change on Pji, country j changes Pi j by λ ji∆Pji. The coefficient λ ji measures
the negotiation power between i and j. It could depend on many other factors, such as political
considerations and trade deficits; thus, we assume it is a constant in the potential trade war. To
maintain the unit sum in each row of P, we need to change Pj j by −∆Pji and Pii by −λ ji∆Pji.
Now we introduce a few notations for the next two theorems. Let In be the n× n identity
matrix and let pi−i be the transpose of pi with pii removed. The matrix Zi is the transpose of P
with the ith row and the ith column removed. Also, the column vector αi extracts the ith row
from P and then drops its ith element. As usual, 0n (or 1n) is the n×1 column vector with zeros
(or ones, respectively). For any j = 1, · · · ,n, the n×1 vector e j has one for its jth element and
zeros elsewhere. Finally, γ ji takes the values of e j and then removes its ith element.
Theorem 1 With the above setting, we have
dpii
dPji
=−
(λ jipii−pi j)1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1γ ji
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
(2)
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and
dpi−i
dPji
= (λ jipii−pi j)(In−1−Zi)
−1
[
γ ji−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1γ ji
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
αi
]
. (3)
As (In−1 − Zi)
−1 = In−1 + Zi + Z
2
i + Z
3
i + · · · has all non-negative elements, the sign of
Eq.(2) is determined by λ jipii−pi j. Thus, country i would increase (or decrease) Pji if and only
if λ ji < pi j/pii (or λ ji > pi j/pii, respectively). Therefore, λ ji > pi j/pii is a simple rule for i to
identify the potential target j for conflict such that a negative dPji could bring a positive dpii.
A precise rule for i to start a trade war against j would be a significantly negative derivative in
Eq.(2). Also, the trade war has indirect side effects on all countries other than i, quantified by
Eq.(3).
A cooperative choice of λ ji is also implied in Eq.(2). Clearly, Eq.(2) infers that λ ji = pi j/pii
is country i’s bottom line to keep. To maintain a zero deficit and zero surplus of trade between
these two countries, a benchmark choice of λ ji is g ji, the ratio of country j’s GDP over i’s GDP.
If so, country i’s reduced imports from j, which are ∆Pji of j’s GDP, exactly offset country
j’s deduction in imports from i, which are g ji∆Pji of i’s GDP. Therefore, λ ji = g ji is j’s goal
in the negotiation whenever g ji > pi j/pii. However, trade deficits could be a major reason for
country i to start a trade war against j. Therefore, the midpoint between pi j/pii and g ji could be
an acceptable solution of λ ji by both parties, especially because the derivative Eq.(2) is a linear
function of λ ji.
Finally, to make the results comparable across countries, we use percentage changes in both
pii and Pji. For example, the percentage change of pii with respect to the percentage of Pji is
dlog(pii)
dlog(Pji)
=
(dpii)/pii
(dPji)/Pji
=
Pji
pii
dpii
dPji
.
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Economic Globalization
Our next question is whether a country should retreat from global economic integration. A pro-
tectionistic action could raise tariffs on all imported goods, set import quotas for all countries,
enact stricter government regulations on imports, and withdraw from international economic
organizations. Gaming on the matrix P, if country i increases globalization, it shrinks its value
of Pii. Otherwise, it increases Pii if it increases protectionism.
As the actions have no specific target countries, we make the following assumption: when
P has a change in the ith column, the other columns change proportionally to ensure each row
has a unit sum. Say, i changes Pii by ∆Pii. This triggers changes on the whole matrix P, say ∆P.
First, the other values in the ith row respond proportionally to the change of ∆Pii, and the ith
row of ∆P is
∆Pii
(
−
Pi1
1−Pii
, · · · ,−
Pi,i−1
1−Pii
,1,−
Pi,i+1
1−Pii
, · · · ,−
Pin
1−Pii
)
.
Secondly, for any j 6= i, the change −
Pi j∆Pii
1−Pii
on Pi j causes j’s reaction of a change −
λi jPi j∆Pii
1−Pii
on
Pji. Therefore, the ith column of ∆P is
∆Pii
(
−
λi1Pi1
1−Pii
, · · · ,−
λi,i−1Pi,i−1
1−Pii
,1,−
λi,i+1Pi,i+1
1−Pii
, · · · ,−
λinPin
1−Pii
)′
.
Lastly, for any Pst where s 6= i and t 6= i, its proportional response to ∆Psi = −
λisPis∆Pii
1−Pii
is
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λisPisPst
(1−Pii)(1−Psi)
∆Pii. We define the matrix M by


λi1Pi1P11
(1−Pii)(1−P1i)
· · ·
λi1Pi1P1,i−1
(1−Pii)(1−P1i)
−λi1Pi1
1−Pii
λi1Pi1P1,i+1
(1−Pii)(1−P1i)
· · · λi1Pi1P1n(1−Pii)(1−P1i)
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
λi,i−1Pi,i−1Pi−1,1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi−1,i)
· · ·
λi,i−1Pi,i−1Pi−1,i−1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi−1,i)
−λi,i−1Pi,i−1
1−Pii
λi,i−1Pi,i−1Pi−1,i+1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi−1,i)
· · ·
λi,i−1Pi,i−1Pi−1,n
(1−Pii)(1−Pi−1,i)
−Pi1
1−Pii
· · ·
−Pi,i−1
1−Pii
1
−Pi,i+1
1−Pii
· · · −Pin
1−Pii
λi,i+1Pi,i+1Pi+1,1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi+1,i)
· · ·
λi,i+1Pi,i+1Pi+1,i−1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi+1,i)
−λi,i+1Pi,i+1
1−Pii
λi,i+1Pi,i+1Pi+1,i+1
(1−Pii)(1−Pi+1,i)
· · ·
λi,i+1Pi,i+1Pi+1,n
(1−Pii)(1−Pi+1,i)
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
λinPinPn1
(1−Pii)(1−Pni)
· · ·
λinPinPn,i−1
(1−Pii)(1−Pni)
−λinPin
1−Pii
λinPinPn,i+1
(1−Pii)(1−Pni)
· · · λinPinPnn(1−Pii)(1−Pni)


.
Then ∆P = ∆PiiM. We also let Mi be M with its ith column dropped.
Theorem 2 With the above setting, we have
dpii
dPii
=−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1(piMi)
′
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
(4)
and
dpi−i
dPii
= (In−1−Zi)
−1
[
(piMi)
′−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1(piMi)
′
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
αi
]
. (5)
The decision rule is then: country i could engage in globalization (or protectionism) if dpii
dPii
is
significantly negative (or positive, respectively) for both λ ji = pi j/pii and λ ji = g ji. Otherwise, if
only one derivative is negative, the decision depends on the country’s bargaining power λ ji with
all other countries. The size of Eq.(4) determines how much the country would advocate further
globalization or anti-globalization, and Eq.(5) measures the side effects of one unit shock of Pii
on all other countries.
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Empirical Study
We calculate pi and its derivatives with respect to Pii or Pji for the year 2018 in this empirical
study. The calculations for Eq.(2)—Eq.(5) are straightforward, and the data come from the UN
ComTrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org/). For comparison, we also use the year 2000,
which was before China joined the World Trade Organization. For simplicity, we only present
the results for China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Russia, and the G7 countries (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the USA). Their ISO-3 country codes
are CHN, RUS, CAN, FRA, DEU, ITA, JPN, GBR, and USA, respectively. We consider two ex-
treme cases for λ ji: either λ ji = pi j/pii or λ ji = g ji. For λ ji between the extremes, the derivatives
change accordingly. The results are in the following tables.
Table 1 lists pii, the GDP ratios g ji, and the pii ratios for 2018. If the numerator is smaller
than the denominator at the ith row and jth column, then j is a potential trade-war target for i.
Also, Matthew effects are clearly demonstrated. For example, the USA and China’s GDP ratio
was 1.609, but their pii ratio was 3.535. The mid-point solution for the USA-China trade war
is λ ji = (.2829+ .6215)/2 = .4522. According to this solution, for each dollar’s decrease of
imports from China to the USA, China should decrease its imports from the USA by .4522 ∗
1.609= .7276 dollars.
Secondly, Table 2 lists the derivatives of logpi with respect to logPji for both 2000 and 2018,
calculated from Eq.(2). If the USA cut 1% of its imports from China in 2018, for example, its pii
would increase .15379% when λ ji = g ji. While the USA may have had reasons to launch trade
wars against all other eight counterparts, its top target was China in 2018, according to the last
row of numerators. In contrast, Japan would have been the USA’s top target in 2000, based on
the last row of denominators. On the other hand, Russia had no incentive to launch trade wars
against the other eight in either 2000 or 2018.
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Table 1: pii, pi j/pii, and g ji for 2018
∗
i\
j CAN CHN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN RUS USA pii GDP
CAN 4.496
7.521
1.639
2.323
1.781
1.635
2.087
1.663
1.017
1.221
1.904
2.810
.3874
.9688
15.89
12.10 .0207 1.701
CHN .2224.1330
.3647
.3089
.3962
.2174
.4642
.2212
.2263
.1623
.4235
.3737
.0862
.1288
3.535
1.609 .0930 12.79
DEU .6100.4304
2.742
3.237
1.086
.7036
1.273
.7159
.6205
.5254
1.161
1.210
.2363
.4170
9.695
5.208 .0339 3.951
FRA .5614.6118
2.524
4.601
.9204
1.421
1.172
1.018
.5711
.7467
1.069
1.719
.2175
.5927
8.923
7.403 .0368 2.780
GBR .4792.6012
2.155
4.522
.7857
1.397
.8536
.9828
.4875
.7338
.9124
1.690
.1856
.5825
7.617
7.275 .0432 2.828
ITA .9830.8193
4.420
6.162
1.612
1.903
1.751
1.339
2.051
1.363
1.872
2.303
.3808
.7937
15.63
9.914 .0210 2.075
JPN .5252.3558
2.361
2.676
.8611
.8267
.9356
.5816
1.096
.5918
.5343
.4343
.2035
.3447
8.349
4.306 .0394 4.779
RUS 2.581
1.032
11.61
7.763
4.232
2.398
4.598
1.687
5.387
1.717
2.626
1.260
4.915
2.901
41.03
12.49 .0080 1.647
USA .0629.0826
.2829
.6215
.1032
.1920
.1121
.1351
.1313
.1375
.0640
.1009
.1198
.2323
.0244
.0801 .3287 20.58
* The numerator is pi j/pii and the denominator is g ji. GDPs are in trillion US dollars.
Table 2: 1,000× dlogpii
dlogPji
for 2018 and 2000∗
i\
j CAN CHN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN RUS USA
CAN −31.921−6.9464
−7.4591
−5.3573
.76251
.24679
3.9226
−.77125
−1.7131
−.82982
−6.3248
−15.805
−1.0397
−.18488
170.41
175.04
CHN 9.1044
7.2014
8.9096
3.2752
11.797
9.7499
18.459
11.829
4.0011
6.0879
8.3845
−23.821
−7.9939
−6.0472
91.339
113.68
DEU 1.973
2.3983
−10.929
−1.8951
28.213
24.282
25.533
21.289
7.7696
12.28
−.70789
−7.9824
−10.61
−4.9806
43.601
64.472
FRA −.90782−.20543
−33.313
−8.6158
−75.534
−60.335
8.8911
−5.389
−22.794
−9.5107
−5.8535
−14.243
−12.022
−3.4476
16.539
29.152
GBR −8.1543.51922
−73.317
−11.702
−82.056
−35.785
−9.9121
3.5357
−18.761
−2.5252
−14.443
−24.061
−17.879
−6.2428
7.0908
65.484
ITA 1.1806.67552
−21.623
−6.5218
−23.094
−36.551
23.758
11.971
13.711
4.5379
−1.8656
−10.305
−16.837
−13.818
28.187
30.361
JPN 8.0802
8.748
−27.973
10.847
1.5372
6.8102
7.3513
9.7373
10.992
12.021
2.705
5.9351
−8.0108
−1.4641
109.24
200.98
RUS 2.5979
4.0738
56.634
15.746
51.426
51.694
23.64
29.004
15.624
22.895
20.924
35.15
11.318
3.5399
34.595
47.324
USA −17.999−13.688
−153.79
−36.888
−36.148
−36.434
−4.8601
−9.0319
−1.7654
−17.213
−11.114
−9.7633
−37.532
−91.671
−7.4639
−3.3488
* Use λ ji = g ji. The derivatives reduce by half if λ ji =
1
2
(g ji +pi j/pii) and to zeros if λ ji = pi j/pii.
* The numerators are for 2018 and the denominators for 2000.
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Table 3: 1,000×
dlogpi j
dlogPii
for 2018∗
i\
j CAN CHN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN RUS USA pii
CAN −11.09−504.7
5.699
−24.76
10.04
.2544
10.48
3.826
2.469
.0857
10.79
2.087
6.533
−26.11
11.82
−2.058
−16.76
12.42 .0207
CHN 17.04
112.0
−54.86
−4648
−.9955
−192.5
54.33
50.23
35.68
156.8
26.13
−61.79
−26.29
−1008
−136.2
−815.3
23.84
209.2 .0930
DEU 13.42
34.57
2.116
−58.49
−59.31
−799.0
−18.44
−15.25
−5.464
34.67
−25.68
−88
12.24
−32.04
−30.83
−197.7
15.51
45.91 .0339
FRA 22.39−34.38
13.11
−95.68
−95.53
−257.1
−85.56
119.5
−13.37
−53.12
−73.3
−213.4
21.28
−86.24
−7.61
−161.4
25.05
−24.5 .0368
GBR 13.07−67.26
7.336
−141.4
−59.67
−224.1
−20.82
−130.7
−77.45
803.8
−5.652
−143.5
23.61
−128.8
11.72
−154.0
25.06
−46.05 .0432
ITA 8.974−2.274
9.116
−30.71
−42.29
−143.2
−28.67
−72.09
−2.765
−18.37
−32.33
−959.7
10.37
−32.48
−15.99
−130.8
11.44
6.828 .0210
JPN 12.32
123.2
−61.06
−396.4
4.96
18.54
26.73
89.67
20.07
99.82
25.68
76.83
−47.67
−3103
−10.52
66.41
13.27
157.6 .0394
RUS 5.393
21.36
−2.462
−41.45
−7.02
−23.95
2.754
26.99
3.335
38.71
−3.86
1.478
1.486
−19.25
−36.12
−4043
5.207
22.25 .0080
USA −918.8−2319
202.1
−1845
197.9
−1248
309.1
−954.4
235.1
−817.4
303.4
−1054
130.9
−2127
344.1
−783.7
−279.1
902.05 .3287
* The numerator is for λ ji = pi j/pii and the denominator is for λ ji = g ji.
Next, Tables 3 and 4 list the derivative of logpi with respect to logPji for 2018 and 2000, re-
spectively. The diagonal elements are calculated from Eq.(4) and the off-diagonal from Eq.(5).
From the diagonal, globalization significantly helped Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and Russia. The effects on France, the United Kingdom, and the USA in 2018 depended on
their bargaining powers λ ji. In the case of λ ji = g ji where 902.05 (or 803.81) largely dominates
279.1 (or 77.454, respectively), the USA and the United Kingdom would be the two biggest
advocates of anti-globalization. This could help to explain recent events such as the USA’s
withdrawal from international organizations and the United Kingdom’s Brexit. In contrast, all
nine countries supported globalization in 2000, seen from the diagonal of Table 4. The last
columns in Tables 4 and 3 compare the changes of pii from 2000 to 2018. In this period, China
quadrupled its pii while Japan lost half of its pii.
Finally, we study the side effects on third parties as a result of the USA’s trade war against
China in 2018. Table 5 is calculated from Eq.(3). When the USA reduced its imports from China
by 1%, China suffered a .30696% loss in pii. Except for Canada, all of the other six countries
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Table 4: 1,000×
dlogpi j
dlogPii
for 2000∗
i\
j CAN CHN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN RUS USA pii
CAN −10.67−346.1
4.3797
−11.92
9.1137
2.8653
9.675
5.547
7.063
4.039
10.35
7.022
9.059
−8.033
9.193
1.467
−14.47
−9.113 .0212
CHN .8737−47.94
−13.51
−2291
−5.972
−102.4
6.844
−55.7
−.5165
−82.35
5.927
−27.58
−14.75
−346.4
−21.15
−143.2
2.513
−31.41 .0233
DEU 17.54
3.720
3.011
−59.17
−65.47
−1104
−40.23
−154.9
−21.1
−121.9
−30.64
−146.8
19.27
−39.38
−43.45
−261.8
18.37
13.60 .0403
FRA 17.21−64.68
7.697
−93.46
−61.26
−261
−67.5
−503
−22.48
−170.4
−46.42
−199.4
23.21
−81.97
−18.89
−182.2
20.49
−53.95 .0383
GBR 6.1434−88.18
4.976
−115.7
−50.75
−288.5
−38.81
−235.5
−72.24
−679.3
−9.176
−171.1
27.804
−105.6
−.7005
−156
20.47
−61.25 .0453
ITA 12.40−54.53
1.469
−96.64
−52.63
−270.4
−43.75
−229.4
−7.56
−149.6
−37.78
−1291
16.56
−79.54
−50.02
−273.8
15.422
−40.99 .0287
JPN 10.56
394.2
−311.4
−1845
−.0915
63.01
54.12
277.4
17.23
212.6
56.05
392.6
−98.93
−9370
59.75
446.0
12.33
478.0 .0840
RUS 2.092
1.040
−3.06
−34.33
−2.86
−24.57
1.075
−5.189
−.1193
−2.852
−3.534
−24.08
1.303
−11.17
−45.39
−3231
1.890
1.157 .0033
USA −939−2645
41.37
−2150
164.1
−1423
276.1
−1151
−26.63
−1550
365.0
−883.1
121.9
−2733
346.8
−1052
−232.2
27.31 .3738
* The numerator is for λ ji = pi j/pii and the denominator is for λ ji = g ji.
Table 5: Side Effects of USA’s Trade War against China in 2018 on Third-Parties∗
k CAN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN RUS CHN USA
dlogpik
dlogPji
-.09867 .04074 .03337 .02734 .04309 .06102 .08104 .30696 -.15379
* Use λ ji = g ji. The derivatives reduce by half if λ ji =
1
2
(g ji +pi j/pii) and to zeros if λ ji = pi j/pii.
* Country i is USA and j is CHN.
were also negatively affected. Therefore, to preserve their own interests, these countries could
have made efforts to prevent the escalation of the war.
Discussions
Economic globalization and trade wars have emerged as international public interests because
of global competition among countries, large-scale restructure of the labor markets, and in-
ternational redistribution of added value and inequity. We argue that data could have already
sufficiently reflected these, and even more considerations, in imports and exports. Therefore,
we attempt to extract a country’s relative strength from the data and identify its best strategies
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for dealing with trade conflicts.
The forgoing account, however, ignores several vital factors that deserve further investi-
gation. First, unlike an economic superpower in the trading network, an emerging economy
may focus on the absolute growth of exports instead of comparative advantages. Thus, max-
imizing pii may not be its objective. Secondly, we have not included the capital, technology,
and information sides of economic globalization. They interplay with goods and services, but
their data are not as easily accessible as goods and services. Thirdly, the economic integra-
tion of regional economies is also not included. Based on Table 1, Table 3 (with λ ji = pi j/pii),
and Table 5, Canada and the USA have no significant conflicts, and they have formed a strong
regional collaboration. Lastly, one could admit other variables to the production-sided counter-
balance Eq.(1), such as labor mitigation, the environment, national security, and those from the
consumption side.
One could extend the framework in several directions. First, rather choosing between a
bilateral trade war and anti-globalization, a country could also target a select group of partners
without directly affecting other countries. As Table 2 indicates, the USA could simultaneously
raise the tariff rates on imports from China, Japan, and Germany. Secondly, though the dynamic
system of Eq.(2)–Eq.(5) assumes a fixed P, the matrix P would change with the system if we
add a time dimension. Next, besides the competitiveness and GDP ratios, we could let λ ji
depend on other determinants, such as trade deficits. Finally, in anticipation of the side effects
due to i’s trade war against j, country j could seek cooperation with third parties, which could
also suffer from the conflict.
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Supplementary materials
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
When we make a small perturbation ∆P to P in Eq.(1), the new authority distribution pi +∆pi
satisfies the counterbalance equation of
pi +∆pi = (pi +∆pi)[P+∆P] (A.1)
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subject to ∆P1n = 0n and ∆pi1n = 0. After subtracting pi = piP from Eq.(A.1), we get ∆pi [In−
P] = pi∆P+∆pi∆P and its first-order approximation
∆pi [In−P]≈ pi∆P. (A.2)
We let Pji have a small change ∆Pji and attempt to calculate its effect on pi . Accordingly,
P have three other changes: −∆Pji on Pj j to offset the change on Pji in the same row; λ ji∆Pji
on Pi j for country j’s reaction upon i’s change at Pji; −λ ji∆Pji on Pii to maintain the unit sum
of the ith row. Without loss of generality, we assume 1≤ i < j ≤ n. Dividing Eq.(A.2) by ∆Pji
and letting ∆Pji → 0, we get the following derivative of pi with respect to Pji:
dpi
dPji
[In−P] = pi
dP
dPji
=
(
0, · · · ,0,−λ jipii +pi j,0, · · · ,0,λ jipii−pi j,0, · · · ,0
)
(A.3)
where all elements are zeros except the ith and the jth. We partition the transpose of P as
P′ =


H1 η1 H2 η2 H3
µ1 Pii µ2 Pji µ3
H4 η3 H5 η4 H6
µ4 Pi j µ5 Pj j µ6
H7 η5 H8 η6 H9


(A.4)
where η1, · · · ,η6 are column vectors, µ1, · · · ,µ6 are row vectors, andH1, · · · ,H9 are sub-matrices
of P′.
To solve dpii
dPji
from Eq.(A.3), we write the augmented matrix for the identity dpi
dPji
1n = 0 and
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the transpose of Eq.(A.3) as


1′i−1 1 1
′
j−i−1 1 1
′
n− j 0
Ii−1−H1 −η1 −H2 −η2 −H3 0i−1
−µ1 1−Pii −µ2 −Pji −µ3 −λ jipii +pi j
−H4 −η3 I j−i−1−H5 −η4 −H6 0 j−i−1
−µ4 −Pi j −µ5 1−Pj j −µ6 λ jipii−pi j
−H7 −η5 −H8 −η6 In− j−H9 0n− j


(A.5)
After we multiply 

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 Ii−1 0 0 0 0
0 1′i−1 1 1
′
j−i−1 1 1
′
n− j
0 0 0 I j−i−1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 In− j


(A.6)
to the left side of Eq.(A.5), then the i+1st row of Eq.(A.5) becomes a zero vector and all other
rows remain unchanged.
After dropping the i+ 1st row in Eq.(A.5) and moving the ith column to the first column
without changing the order of other columns, we obtain the augmented matrix for
(
dpii
dPji
,
dpi ′−i
dPji
)′
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as 
 1 1
′
n−1 0
−αi In−1−Zi (λ jipii−pi j)γ ji

 . (A.7)
We next multiply 
 1 −1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1
0 In−1

 (A.8)
to the left side of Eq.(A.7) to get

 1+1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi 0
′
n−1 −(λ jipii−pi j)1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1γ ji
−αi In−1−Zi (λ jipii−pi j)γ ji

 . (A.9)
Therefore, by the first row of Eq.(A.9),
dpii
dPji
=−
(λ jipii−pi j)1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1γ ji
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
.
Also, by the second row of Eq.(A.9),
−
dpii
dPji
αi +(In−1−Zi)
dpi−i
dPji
= (λ jipii−pi j)γ ji
and thus
dpi−i
dPji
= (In−1−Zi)
−1
[
(λ jipii−pi j)γ ji +
dpii
dPji
αi
]
= (λ jipii−pi j)(In−1−Zi)
−1
[
γ ji−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1γ ji
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
αi
]
.
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A2. Proof of Theorem 2
With the change of Pii by ∆Pii, we have ∆P = ∆PiiM and
dP
dPii
= M. We write M as M =
[ξ1,ξ2, · · · ,ξn] where ξ j is the jth column of M. Then ξ1+ξ2+ · · ·+ξn = 0n. By Eq.(A.2),
dpi
dPii
[In−P] = pi
dP
dPii
= piM = (piξ1, · · · ,piξn) . (A.10)
With the partition Eq.(A.4) of P′, the augmented matrix for the identity dpi
dPii
1n = 0 and the
transpose of Eq.(A.10) is


1′i−1 1 1
′
j−i−1 1 1
′
n− j 0
Ii−1−H1 −η1 −H2 −η2 −H3 (piξ1, · · · ,piξi−1)
′
−µ1 1−Pii −µ2 −Pji −µ3 piξi
−H4 −η3 I j−i−1−H5 −η4 −H6 (piξi+1, · · · ,piξ j−1)
′
−µ4 −Pi j −µ5 1−Pj j −µ6 piξ j
−H7 −η5 −H8 −η6 In− j−H9 (piξ j+1, · · · ,piξn)
′


(A.11)
We multiply Eq.(A.6) to the left side of Eq.(A.11) to make the i+1st row of Eq.(A.11) to zeros.
After dropping the i+ 1st row in Eq.(A.11) and moving the ith column to the first column
without changing the order of other columns, we get the augmented matrix for
(
dpii
dPii
,
dpi ′−i
dPii
)′
as

 1 1
′
n−1 0
−αi In−1−Zi (piMi)
′

 . (A.12)
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We next multiply Eq.(A.8) to the left side of Eq.(A.12) to get

 1+1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi 0
′
n−1 −1
′
n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1(piMi)
′
−αi In−1−Zi (piMi)
′

 . (A.13)
Therefore, by the first row of Eq.(A.13),
dpii
dPii
=−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1(piMi)
′
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
.
Also, by the second row of Eq.(A.13),
−
dpii
dPii
αi +(In−1−Zi)
dpi−i
dPii
= (piMi)
′
and thus
dpi−i
dPii
= (In−1−Zi)
−1
[
(piMi)
′+ dpii
dPii
αi
]
= (In−1−Zi)
−1
[
(piMi)
′−
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1(piMi)
′
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)
−1αi
αi
]
.
20
